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Abstract
This paper analyzes the socio-economic dimension of vulnerability and resilience
from the viewpoint of connectivity. While no consensus has yet emerged on the
definitions of vulnerability and resilience or on their relationship, it has been
recognized that both have an important normative dimension, in that whether a
system is considered vulnerable or resilient depends on the interests of the
stakeholders involved. The paper proposes a dimension of resilience and vulner-
ability that is likely to be shared across a significant spectrum of stakeholders. To
do so, the paper analyses connectivity within social-ecological systems from a
BStructural Political Economy^ viewpoint. A key concept in this regard is
Bsystemic interest^, which is defined as the interest of stakeholders in keeping
viable the system of connections within which they act. Systemic interest has
desirable properties to conceptualize the normative dimension of vulnerability and
resilience and leads to problematize their link with connectivity. In fact, it raises
the question of what features of connectivity can be expected to lead to systemic
interest, and how this impinges on vulnerability and resilience in different con-
texts. On the one hand, one might expect that a more interconnected system is
more vulnerable to shocks, which propagate more easily throughout the system.
On the other hand, such system might have a stronger systemic interest, so that a
shock would trigger stakeholders’ reaction to counteract its effects and avoid
systemic consequences. The paper points to the institutional conditions that might
make either outcome more likely in any given context.
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1 Introduction
The concepts of vulnerability and resilience are often used to understand properties of
social-ecological systems, i.e. systems that B[reflect] the idea that human action and
social structures are integral to nature and hence any distinction between social and
natural systems is arbitrary^ (Adger 2006, p. 269; see also Reggiani et al. 2002; Turner
Jr. et al. 2003).1,2 More specifically, vulnerability describes Bstates of susceptibility to
harm, powerlessness, and marginality of both physical and social systems^ (Adger
2006, p. 269; see also O'Brien et al. 2007). Resilience refers to Bthe magnitude of
disturbance that can be tolerated before a socioecological system (SES) moves to a
different region of state space controlled by a different set of processes^ (Carpenter
et al. 2001, p. 765) as well as Bthe capacity to self-organise and the capacity for
adaptation to emerging circumstances^ (Adger 2006, pp. 268–9; see also Holling 1973;
Folke 2006). And while vulnerability and resilience are widely seen as related concepts
that Bhave common elements of interest—the shocks and stresses experienced by the
social-ecological system, the response of the system, and the capacity for adaptive
action^ (Adger 2006, p. 270), the connections between them are yet to be fully fleshed
out (Modica and Reggiani 2015; see also Janssen and Ostrom 2006; Reggiani 2013;
Caschili et al. 2015).
For the purposes of the present article, vulnerability and resilience can be treated
jointly because they both have an important socio-political element. In fact, vulnera-
bility Bdoes not exist in isolation from the wider political economy of resource use.
Vulnerability is driven by inadvertent or deliberate human action that reinforces self-
interest and the distribution of power in addition to interacting with physical and
ecological systems^ (Adger 2006, p. 270). Analogously, resilience Brelates to the
response of a system to disturbance or change, whether that disturbance is sudden
and shocking or more gradual. When a system is subjected to disturbance, these are the
only possible outcomes: it withstands the disturbance, maintaining the specified fea-
tures of interest, or not; if not, it either recovers the features of interest in an acceptable
time frame or not; if it does not maintain the specified features of interest and does not
recover them, but ends up in a different condition following disturbance, then the
question is whether or not the change in the system is considered desirable, or even an
improvement^ (Adger 2006, p. 270, emphasis added). In fact, the Bpolicy implications
of vulnerability and resilience are profound and contested. Policies and strategies,
which reduce vulnerability and promote resilience change the status quo for many
agencies and institutions and are frequently resisted^ (Adger 2006, p. 278).
The socio-economic dimension of resilience and vulnerability requires that we
analyze the conflicting interests of stakeholders. In particular, we must study the
1 Examples of systems studied from this perspective are transportation networks (Cantillo et al. 2018;
Tamvakis and Xenidis 2012), urban systems (Östh et al. 2018) and electrical power systems (Holmgren
2007) among others.
2 This broad definition of social-ecological systems includes spatial economic systems, for the latter represent
the spatial dimension of production and consumption (Nijkamp and Ratajczak 2013), which weave together
social and natural elements. Moreover, the paper will use the concepts of Bsocial-ecological system^ and
Bsocio-economic systems^ interchangeably. In fact, while the strands of literature referred to in this paper tend
to use one or the other of those concepts more frequently, both concepts refer to the intertwining of social
(including economic) and natural aspects, and hence do not need to be kept distinct for the purposes of this
paper.
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conditions under which it is possible to specify dimensions of vulnerability and
resilience that are compatible with stakeholders’ pursuit of their own interests.
In fact, since any change in the system would favor some stakeholders over others,
any policies that change the status quo would be contested by at least some stake-
holders (Cardinale 2015).3 In this sense, it is true that Bwhat constitutes improvement or
detriment is observer dependent^ (Helfgott 2018, p. 853; see also Carpenter et al.
2001). However, this paper argues that the concept of Bsystemic interest^ (Cardinale
2015, 2017, 2018b) can help identify a dimension of vulnerability and resilience that is
likely to be shared across stakeholders. Systemic interest is the interest of stakeholders
to preserve the viability of the socio-economic system within which they act. In fact,
because of connectivity, changes that favor some stakeholders but might make the
system unviable would end up jeopardizing the interests of those very stakeholders.
Therefore, a view of vulnerability and resilience defined in terms of systemic interest is
likely to be shared across stakeholders, because it is connected with the ability of the
system to remain viable. It is important to note that this approach does not impose a
unique direction of desirable change but a range within which change does not
jeopardize viability. In other words, defining vulnerability and resilience on the basis
of systemic interest provides not a univocally determined objective, but a constraint on
the pursuit of particular interests on the part of stakeholders.
In the approach proposed in this paper, features of connectivity are fundamental for
understanding which social-ecological systems are likely to afford a systemic interest.4
In fact, connectivity determines whether a shock to a part of the system is more or less
likely to affect systemic viability; it also has a crucial influence on whether a suffi-
ciently wide spectrum of stakeholders have an interest in counteracting the effects of
such a shock. In particular, the paper explores which features of connectivity are likely
to generate an interest in maintaining the viability of the system by addressing shocks
through policies (resilience) and in addressing exposure to shocks (vulnerability). It
also discusses what institutional features are likely to favor or hinder such outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the BStructural
Political Economy^ approach to explore how structural economic analysis can be
revisited to define stakeholders through the study of connectivity in social-ecological
systems. Section 3 suggests a route to identify conflicting interests and systemic
interest. Section 4 presents the central contribution of the paper: exploring what features
of connectivity are more likely to be associated with systemic interest, and how this
impinges on resilience and vulnerability. A short section concludes.
3 The paper starts from analysing viability in the static sense that is associated with an economy whose
technology is unchanged, and then goes on to discuss possible extensions to the viability of economies under
conditions of structural change.
4 In political economy, the concept of system can be defined on the basis different kinds of interconnectedness
between parts of the system itself. In this paper, the concept of system based on productive interdependencies
(introduced in Section 2) will be put in relation to that of network. Following Calderelli and Vespignani
(2007), we can adopt the general definitions of a network as Ba graph whose nodes (vertices) identify the
elements of the system. The set of connecting links (edges) represents the presence of a relation or interaction
among these elements^ (Calderelli and Vespignani 2007, p. 5) and connectivity as the property whereby
B[when] a path exists between any couple of vertices […] in a graph, the graph is connected^ (Calderelli and
Vespignani 2007, p. 10). Among the manifold studies of networks and connectivity analysis, see for example
the contributions in Friesz (2007).
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2 Structural Representations of Socio-Economic Systems: From
Structural Economic Analysis to Structural Political Economy
In structural economic analysis, connectivity in the economy is typically understood
from the viewpoint of division of labor. Whilst its roots can be traced back to
Physiocracy and Classical Political Economy, modern structural analysis can be seen
as starting from the work of Leontief (1941), von Neumann (1945), and Sraffa (1960).
In particular, it explains key features of economic systems on the basis of interdepen-
dencies between parts of the system, and especially between industries (see Baranzini
and Scazzieri 2012). The analysis of connectivity in modern structural analysis has
largely focused on the technical and material conditions under which production,
income distribution and economic growth take place within economic systems. Struc-
tural economic analysis has very important connections with spatial economics, under-
stood as the study of Bthe spatial pattern and interaction of systems of production,
distribution or consumption (or more generally, human activities) in a spatial context^
(Nijkamp and Ratajczak 2013, p. 9). A clear example of these connections is the use of
concepts and techniques derived from structural economic analysis, such as input-
output schemes, to address key issues in spatial economics, as pioneered by Isard’s
(1951) application of Leontief’s approach to the spatial modelling of the economy.
In structural economic analysis, the socio-political stakeholders have typically been
identified in terms of social groups defined on the basis of their type of income, e.g. as
receiving wages or profit (see Baranzini and Mirante 2013 for a broader discussion of
the definition of social groups that are compatible with different economic models).
The BStructural Political Economy^ (SPE) approach (Cardinale 2015, 2017, 2018b;
Cardinale and Landesmann 2017; Cardinale and Scazzieri 2018) aims to provide a
more general framework to analyze the socio-political dimension of economic
systems, revealing manifold possibilities to identify relevant stakeholders. In fact, from
an SPE perspective, models of division of labor can be seen as maps of constraints and
opportunities for different stakeholders (Cardinale 2018b). For example, input-output
representations of connectivity model the economy as a set of interdependent indus-
tries, whereby the output of each industry provides inputs to other industries. A key
constraint, expressed by the Hawkins–Simon viability conditions (Hawkins and Simon
1949; see also Nikaido 2008), is that the economy must remain within proportions
between industries that make it possible to reproduce the inputs used in production and
generate a surplus. Opportunities can be seen as being associated with receiving a
higher share of the system’s surplus—but this depends on who the relevant stake-
holders are. For example, for a social group defined on the basis of the type of income,
this would amount to e.g. to a higher share of wages or profit. For an industry, the
opportunity might be associated with a higher value added accruing to that industry,
independently of how it is then distributed between categories of income (rent, profit,
wage, etc.) across income earners within the industry (Cardinale 2018b).
We therefore need to delve deeper into the identification of relevant stakeholders
within socio-economic systems. A useful starting point can be found in the idea that
any socio-political aggregation that has an interest in common could, in principle,
organize itself to promote policies that favor its interests. For this purpose, the concept
of ‘potential interest group’ (Truman 1951) can be particularly useful. The idea is to
identify what sociopolitical aggregations (based on division of labor) can be seen as
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potential stakeholders and what their interests may be, irrespective of whether they
actually organize themselves to exert an influence on policy to pursue those interests.
By providing a map of possible aggregations, connectivity in the economy opens up the
possibility to identify different stakeholders, each of which corresponds to a socio-
political aggregation that is relevant in the situation under study. In fact, each model can
be seen as a different representation of division of labor, and each division of labor
makes it possible to identify patterns of connectivity between different actors. There-
fore, even a given division of labor does not determine group affiliations univocally.
For example, it can be shown that a given system of productive interdependencies can
be represented as a set of industries whose output is an input to other industries, or as a
set of ‘vertically integrated sectors’ each of which produces a final commodity through
an input of labour and primary commodities (Pasinetti 1973). From a socio-political
viewpoint, this means that group affiliations (and therefore stakeholders) can be formed
on the basis of industries, or social groups defined on the basis of the type of income, or
vertically integrated sectors. Only in the analysis of specific contexts will it be possible
to judge which criterion of socio-political aggregation, and hence which identification
of relevant stakeholders, is more relevant. For example, analyses of economic devel-
opment have often pointed to conflicts between industries (e.g. Furtado 1967;
Hirschman 1968; Mamalakis 1969). Industries also seem to be crucial to understand
party structure (Ferguson 1995; Ferguson et al. 2018) and transnational lobbying (Coen
2007). In other contexts, however, vertically integrated sectors might be more relevant.
For example, in the case of policies concerning the real exchange rate in the European
Union, the relevant conflict might be between the vertically integrated sectors produc-
ing tradable or non-tradable goods (Cardinale and Landesmann 2017).
3 Vulnerability, Resilience and ‘Systemic Interest’: A Structural Political
Economy Approach
Structural Political Economy provides the analytical tools to delve deeper into the
normative dimension of vulnerability and resilience. Specifically, B[systems] can be
considered resilient as long as the resulting change is judged to be at least as desirable
as the original state or regime. The notion of desirability adds a clearly normative
dimension to resilience^ (Helfgott 2018, p. 853). In fact, resilience Bis normative in that
it relies on the definition of desirable versus undesirable system features. Judgement of
what is desirable and what constitutes improvement or detriment is observer dependent.
Changes that benefit one stakeholder may be detrimental to another. The questions of
who gets to define what is desirable and how this will be negotiated raise interesting
challenges to operationalizing resilience in practice, and directly point to practical and
ethical considerations that the development sector has been wrestling with for
decades^, for example for what concerns Bwhat constitutes development or improve-
ment, for whom and by whom^ (Helfgott 2018, p. 853; see also Carpenter et al. 2001).
In a similar fashion, Bwhere system boundaries are drawn, what is included in the
analysis, which features of the system are allowed to change and which must be
preserved, and what sorts of change constitute improvement, completely determines
what is interpreted as resilience, adaptability, vulnerability or collapse, and so forth^
(Helfgott 2018, p. 853–4). In short, Bresilience is a property of a system that describes
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the nature of the response of the system to a particular disturbance, of a particular
magnitude, from the perspective of a particular observer over a specified timescale^
(Helfgott 2018, p. 854).
We therefore need to problematize what is desirable, and for whom. In fact, it is clear
that different stakeholders are likely to differ in what they consider to be an improve-
ment. But does this mean that there can be no ground to identify dimensions of
resilience and vulnerability that could be shared across stakeholders? SPE can provide
a key concept to address the normative dimension of vulnerability and resilience:
systemic interest. More broadly, it provides a framework to study the interplay of
stakeholders’ particular interests and systemic interest. For example, in the input-output
representations of connectivity (specifically, those based on the Leontief open system),
we can see relevant stakeholders as industries and identify their interest as receiving a
higher share of value added (Cardinale 2018b). Conflict could therefore arise over
quantities, that is, over the proportions between outputs of different industries across
the economy. However, the Hawkins-Simon viability conditions impose that propor-
tions between industries must remain within a certain range (Hawkins and Simon
1949). Alternatively, conflict might take place over prices. However, Steenge and
van den Berg (2001) show that only a given range of prices is compatible with viability
of the system. Therefore, in either case, the system of interdependencies leaves room
for conflicts: if only one configuration of prices or quantities were admissible, conflict
could not take place without making the system unviable. And yet, while conflict is
possible, it must remain within limits that keep the system viable. Systemic interest can
then be defined as the interest in keeping the system viable, for otherwise the pursuit of
policies that change proportions or prices in favor of some stakeholders might make the
system unviable, thus jeopardizing those very stakeholders.
The implication for resilience is that shocks or policies that change quantities or
prices must remain within a range that is compatible with the viability of the system.
Such dimension of resilience is compatible with a variety of interests of stakeholders.
More specifically, it is a constraint on the pursuit of such interests. In fact, systemic
interest does not impose a specific policy, but identifies a range of viable proportions.
As such, it is a constraint on possible outcomes, and is therefore compatible with a
variety of policies (and outcomes). Furthermore, the dimension of resilience based on
viability does not require a Bnormative^ commitment to a view of collective interest
that transcends particular interests; rather, this approach grounds stakeholders’ interest
in viability in the fact that the latter is a necessary condition for the pursuit of particular
interests. Something analogous holds for vulnerability, i.e. the system’s susceptibility to
negative shocks: if vulnerability is likely to affect viability, stakeholders should in
principle share a systemic interest in addressing it.
This approach to resilience and vulnerability, based on the interplay between
particular and systemic interests, derives from the need for each stakeholder to
consider the viability of the system as a whole. Hence, it depends on connectivity:
without connectivity, there would be no reason for stakeholders to consider
systemic viability. And while the foregoing argument has been developed with
respect to input-output relationships between industries, which have traditionally
been understood at a national level, its fundamental reasoning can be extended to
different analytical contexts. First, the approach can be used with reference to
different spatial entities, to investigate the viability of any system of
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interdependencies, including regions, multi-region systems, national economies
and supranational areas. Second, the approach can be generalized to other models
of the production system. For example, this dimension of vulnerability and
resilience can also be explored through models and databases that have been
developed to generalize the basic Leontief approach. Such approaches have been
extended to account for scarce resources (e.g. Quadrio Curzio 2009; Steenge
2015; see also Duchin 2015), and new databases such as the World Input-
Output Database (WIOD) (Timmer et al. 2015) and Exiobase (Tukker et al.
2013; Wood et al. 2015) have been developed to address new features of produc-
tion systems. Moreover, while the models considered above address flows of
commodities across industries, another important component of systemic interest
can be the formation of stocks (Quadrio Curzio 1967, 1975; Cardinale 2015).
Furthermore, viability can be understood not only in the static sense, as was done
above, but also with respect to policies leading to structural change, such as the
economic and political conditions that make stakeholders willing to support
transitions whose outcome is uncertain (Cardinale 2015). Third, and more gener-
ally, the SPE approach can be extended to representations of connectivity that
differ from the typical models of structural economic analysis. In fact, whilst the
analysis above refers to input-output representations where the fundamental units
are industries linked to one another through flows of goods and money, one could
use any relational space, such as those expressed through a network. The idea
would be to take the various possible aggregations suggested by the model being
used (e.g. input-output relations among industries, trade flows among countries,
transport flows among cities, etc.) and evaluate whether it is plausible to consider
such aggregations as potential stakeholders. In other words, through an SPE lens
one would try to identify potential stakeholders and their interests, as well as
conditions for viability of the system; one would then try to infer whether the
relevant stakeholders could have a shared interest in keeping the system viable,
and whether that interest could constitute a shared dimension of vulnerability and
resilience. The possible extensions just discussed suggest that, while in the
remainder of the paper the concepts of Beconomy^ and Bsystem^ refer to a system
of input-output interdependencies between industries within a country, the gist of
the argument can be readily applied to any system of interdependencies under
analysis. In particular, following Simon (1962), it will be suggested in the next
section that the relevant systems and subsystems can be identified on the basis of
the relative strength of interdependencies within and outside the system and
subsystems under consideration.
To summarize, the foregoing analysis suggests two fundamental points about
resilience and vulnerability. First, even if they are relative to a stakeholder (i.e.,
they concern the vulnerability, maintenance or improvement of an aspect that is
of interest to that stakeholder), systemic interest might provide a minimum
ground to be accepted by significant coalitions of stakeholders, because it
concerns the viability of the system as a whole. Second, this definition of
vulnerability and resilience does not dictate a specific interest (or policy), but is
a constraint on the pursuit of stakeholders’ particular interests, which is com-
patible with a variety of proportions and hence with a variety of interests (and
policies).
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4 Connectivity, Resilience, and Systemic Interest: A Socio-Political
Analysis
Systemic interest has emerged from the foregoing analysis as a property deriving from
connectivity. What systems are likely to display systemic interest, depending on their
features of connectivity? And what are the implications for resilience and vulnerability?
Before proceeding, it is useful to note that, as was discussed in a previous section,
resilience and vulnerability are different concepts. Whilst interpretations differ and
there is yet no agreement in the literature on the relationship between the two concepts
(see Modica and Reggiani 2015 for a discussion), following Briguglio et al. (2009) we
can take vulnerability to be a condition of exposure to exogenous shocks, whereas
resilience concerns the ability to recover or improve desirable aspects, which in turn
often requires actions of private actors or policy-makers. However, systemic interest
relates to both concepts, as it can be seen as the interest in keeping the system viable by
addressing shocks through policies (resilience) and/or in addressing the condition of
exposure to shocks (vulnerability). Therefore, for the sake of conciseness, this section
concentrates on resilience, but the reasoning can be readily extended to the identifica-
tion of systemic interest and policy decisions that concern vulnerability.
The seminal work of Herbert Simon on connectivity within hierarchical systems is a
very useful starting point. Simon defines hierarchies as Bsystems composed of interre-
lated subsystems, each of the latter being, in turn, hierarchic in structure until we reach
some lowest level of elementary subsystem^ (Simon 1962, p. 468). In Simon’s
analysis, this definition refers to Ball complex systems analyzable into successive sets
of subsystems^ (Simon 1962, p. 468), including Bsystems in which there is no relation
of subordination among subsystems^ (Simon 1962, p. 468).
Simon goes on to distinguish between Bthe interactions among subsystems, on the
one hand, and the interactions within subsystems— i.e., among the parts of those
subsystems—on the other. The interactions at the different levels may be, and often will
be, of different orders of magnitude^ (Simon 1962, p. 473–4). On this basis, Simon
distinguishes between decomposable systems, in which links between subsystems are
negligible, and nearly decomposable systems, in which links within subsystems are
strong, whereas links between subsystems are weak but not negligible, so that they can
be ignored in the short run but not in the long run (see also Simon and Ando 1961;
Fisher and Ando 1962; Ando and Fisher 1963; Landesmann and Scazzieri 2009). By
extension, we can also consider non-decomposable systems, where links between
subsystems are strong and cannot be ignored even in the short run.
Simon finds that Bnear decomposability is generally very prominent^ (Simon 1962,
p. 475) in social systems, including economic systems. In fact, B[in] economic dynam-
ics, the main variables are the prices and quantities of commodities. It is empirically
true that the price of any given commodity and the rate at which it is exchanged depend
to a significant extent only on the prices and quantities of a few other commodities,
together with a few other aggregate magnitudes, like the average price level or some
over-all measure of economic activity. The large linkage coefficients are associated, in
general, with the main flows of raw materials and semifinished products within and
between industries. An input-output matrix of the economy, giving the magnitudes of
these flows, reveals the nearly decomposable structure of the system—with one
qualification. There is a consumption subsystem of the economy that is linked strongly
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to variables in most of the other subsystems. Hence, we have to modify our notions of
decomposability slightly to accommodate the special role of the consumption subsys-
tem in our analysis of the dynamic behavior of the economy^ (Simon 1962, p. 475).
It is interesting to complement Simon’s distinction with considerations about net-
work topology. For example, one could take two types of connectivity analyzed by
Barabási and Oltvai (2004): random networks, in which Bmost nodes have approxi-
mately the same number of links [and] nodes that significantly deviate from the average
are extremely rare^ (Barabási and Oltvai 2004, p. 105), and scale-free networks, in
which B[the] probability that a node is highly connected is statistically more significant
than in a random graph, the network’s properties often being determined by a relatively
small number of highly connected nodes that are known as hubs^ (Barabási and Oltvai
2004, p. 105). This is important for the analysis of resilience and vulnerability, because
while scale-free networks are much more resistant than random networks to failure of
randomly chosen nodes, they are more vulnerable if failure concerns hubs (Barabási
and Oltvai 2004, p. 110; see also Reggiani 2013 for an application to transport
networks).5
Considering that Simon’s classification highlights the strength (weight) of links,
whereas the Barabási and Oltvai approach focuses on the number of links, and hence on
the distinction between nodes that are hubs and nodes that are not, we can combine the
two classifications (excluding decomposable systems, which are unlikely to character-
ize socio-ecological systems); we thus obtain the four types in Table 1.
What does the typology above suggest for what concerns the first question posed at
the beginning of the section, i.e. the link between connectivity and systemic interest?
We can conjecture that non-decomposable systems, such as the subsystems character-
ized by Simon as having strong internal connectivity, will be likely to display systemic
interest because a shock or policy that makes an industry unviable can directly affect
other industries through interdependencies. However, this result also depends on
network topology. In fact, if the non-decomposable system under consideration is a
scale-free network, so that it has strong links between hubs, systemic interest will
concern keeping the hubs functional, even if a considerable part of other nodes (which
are not hubs) is affected. If the non-decomposable system is a random network, so that
weights are strong both within and between subsystems, systemic interest has to do
with making sure that a sufficient proportion of nodes be kept active, without a clear
priority for certain links over others.
In near-decomposable systems, instead, the crisis of a given subsystem will be
unlikely to lead to effects across the overall system. However, this statement needs to
be qualified in the light of network topology. If the near-decomposable system under
consideration is a random network, we can conjecture that the crisis of a small number
of nodes that are weakly connected to other nodes (because the system is near-
decomposable) is unlikely to compromise systemic viability. However, if the network
is scale-free, i.e. there are weak links between hubs but strong links between each hub
and the other nodes connected to it, it is possible that the crisis of some hubs, though
weakly connected to other hubs, could make the whole network unviable. However,
5 For a general discussion of spatial networks see also Tsiotas and Polyzos (2018). For further applications of
network approaches to other spatial problems, see for example Marshall et al. (2018) and Neal (2018).
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this cannot be determined ex ante, given that, as Barabási and Oltvai (2004) show, the
network’s robustness depends on both the number and strength of links.
For example, in order to analyze systemic interest in the Eurozone through Simon’s
criterion, I suggested that we can assess whether an economy (be it regional, national,
etc.) is near-decomposable or non-decomposable by comparing the relative strength of
productive interdependencies within and outside that economy (Cardinale 2017). If
interdependencies within the economy under investigations are relatively stronger, we
can take the system to be non-decomposable, which in turn suggests that features of
connectivity require that conflicts between stakeholders are constrained by consider-
ation of systemic viability. If interdependencies outside the economy are stronger, we
can expect that important stakeholders will be relatively less concerned with viability of
the economy, because the pursuit of their particular interests is not directly affected by
viability. Hence, whilst perhaps geographically situated within the economy under
investigation, their interdependencies lie elsewhere, so that their interest in systemic
viability might concern a different system. (Of course, geographical proximity could
entail further dimensions of connectivity that the analysis of input-output interdepen-
dencies might not fully capture; and this is a reason why stakeholders’ representation of
the interdependencies to which they are subjected is crucial for determining systemic
interest and understanding resilience, as I argue below). This analysis of viability in the
Eurozone could be extended, following the typology synthesized in Table 1, by
considering whether the system under consideration has the features of a random or
scale-free network. This could have important consequences in terms of understanding
whether systemic interest concerns the preservation of viability of all national econo-
mies in the Eurozone, or only of some economies that appear to be more important
from the viewpoint of the number and/or weight of their links. The consequences of
this difference would obviously be momentous from a political and institutional
viewpoint.
The analysis of socio-economic systems outlined above can arguably provide a way
to address a perceived risk of holistic approaches, i.e. that the Bfundamental interde-
pendence and interrelatedness of all things^ (Helfgott 2018, p. 855) can make it
difficult to draw boundaries and identify subsystems that are analytically manageable.
In fact, this paper suggests a heuristic to draw boundaries between different subsystems
of socio-economic systems, based on analysis of whether interdependencies are likely
to be stronger in some parts of the system than in others and how different network
Table 1 Decomposability and network topology
Scale-free network (Barabási and Oltvai
2004)




Weak links between hubs, strong links
between each hub and the nodes to
which it is connected
Strong links between nodes within a
subsystem, weak links between nodes





Strong links between hubs, as well as
between each hub and the nodes to
which it is connected
Strong links between nodes within and
between subsystems; no hubs
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structures can lead to prioritize certain nodes over others, at least within time horizons
compatible with the analysis at hand.
We can now address the second question: what are the implications for resilience?
This has become a highly topical issue in the light of the ever-increasing interconnec-
tedness of socio-ecological systems across the world (see, for example, Young et al.
2006). If we do not account for changes in policy stances induced by system interest,
we would consider a near-decomposable system more resilient than a non-
decomposable one: the rationale is that shocks to some parts of the system would not
necessarily affect the others in the short run, because of weak links between subsys-
tems. However, as discussed above, this result also depends on network topology: if the
near-decomposable system is scale-free, a shock affecting a hub which is weakly
connected to other hubs could have systemic effects—but this depends on the strength
of connections. With systemic interest, the opposite is likely to be the case: systemic
interest (and changes in policy stances that would preserve it) would be more likely in a
non-decomposable system because a shock would trigger a political reaction. If we
consider network topology, we can further refine this result: in a scale-free network,
systemic interest is more likely to concern preservation of the hubs, whereas in a
random network it is likely to be more concerned with the various nodes without a clear
criterion of priority of some over others. In turn, this poses the problem of understand-
ing whether stakeholders are aware of which nodes can be considered hubs, and
therefore whether there is a systemic interest in preserving them.
For example, it can be conjectured that, in a monetary union, sectors producing
tradable goods in ‘advanced’ economies and sectors producing non-tradable goods in a
‘catching up’ economies will in principle oppose policies that pursue real exchange rate
appreciation in the ‘advanced’ economies, respectively because of considerations of
competitiveness and because of concerns for domestic demand and cost of inputs
(Cardinale and Landesmann 2017). However, once external imbalances threaten the
viability of the monetary union, it is possible that the aforementioned sectors change
their stance, for example because real appreciation in ‘advanced’ economies might
favor an expansion in ‘catching up’ economies whose effect on imports from ‘ad-
vanced’ economies is stronger than the price effect, or because it could allow the
tradable sector of ‘catching up’ economies to recover. In this connection, it might be
interesting to analyse the network structure of tradable and non-tradable sectors across
the Eurozone, with particular attention to the presence of hubs and the strength of
connections between sectors within and across ‘advanced’ and ‘catching up’ countries.
The foregoing analysis of systemic interest is in line with Young et al.’s (2006, p.
312) idea that, unlike biophysical systems, the resilience of socio-ecological systems
also depends on the fact that they are characterized by Bforesight and reflexivity^ of the
actors that operate within them, and that this Bcan lead either to initiatives aimed at
avoiding or mitigating the dangers of globalization or to positive feedback processes
that intensify the impacts of globalization^. However, this paper’s approach suggests
that, in order to assess whether reflexivity will express itself in the awareness of
systemic interest, we need to problematize whether the system under investigation
has institutional arrangements that make it possible for changes in policy stances to
manifest themselves. Therefore, from the viewpoint of this paper, the existence of such
arrangements is a key factor in determining whether resilience is more likely to
characterize non-decomposable or near-decomposable systems. If such institutional
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arrangements are not sufficiently effective, we can expect non-decomposable systems
to be less resilient. In cases in which such institutional arrangements are sufficiently
effective, we can expect that a non-decomposable system will be more resilient because
of systemic interest. Table 2 summarises the relationship between connectivity, sys-
temic interest and resilience put forward in this paper.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the resilience of a given socio-ecological
system depends on its features of connectivity as well as institutional arrangements
that make it possible to act upon systemic interest and preserve resilience in highly
interconnected systems. Another crucial element is stakeholders’ definition of particu-
lar and systemic interests, which in turn depends on their representation of the system
(i.e., their awareness of connectivity). In fact, stakeholders’ representations of connec-
tivity are crucial for determining which aggregations, out of those which are possible
within a given space of connectivity, actually ‘become stakeholders’, and what partic-
ular and systemic interests are seen as such among those which a given system affords
(Cardinale 2018a, b).
To conclude, the SPE approach makes it possible to identify a systemic
interest of stakeholders in a shared dimension of resilience: preserving the
viability of the system in which they operate. The first step is to analyze whether
a given system’s pattern of connectivity makes systemic interest possible. The
further step is to determine what particular and systemic interests are likely to
prevail in a specific case. To do so, we need to look at how stakeholders
represent the system—given that each pattern of connectivity affords a variety
of representations and hence a variety of understandings of particular and
systemic interests. In this light, studies of resilience and connectivity can be
crucial for fostering stakeholders’ awareness of possibilities for systemic interest,
and hence of shared dimensions of resilience.
5 Conclusion
This paper has addressed the socio-political dimension of vulnerability and
resilience from the viewpoint of connectivity. In particular, it has addressed the
normative character of the two concepts, i.e. their dependence upon the interests of
different stakeholders. The key contribution of the paper lies in the use of the concept of
systemic interest (Cardinale 2015, 2017, 2018b) to characterize a dimension of vulner-
ability and resilience that is (or should be) shared across stakeholders, exploring how
this depends on features of network connectivity. Systemic interest was described as the
interest of stakeholders in keeping the system viable. In fact, because of connectivity
through material flows, a shock or policy that pushes proportions between industries or
prices outside a certain range would make the system unviable, jeopardizing the
interests of all stakeholders. On the view proposed in this paper, therefore, resilience
(and reduction of vulnerability) should be conceptualized not as an objective in itself,
but rather as a constraint on the pursuit of particular interests.
The approach developed in this paper can be extended in several directions. One is
to consider how connectivity structures change over time, both endogenously as a result
of technological change, and exogenously as a result of shocks and/or policies. An
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For example, a change in technology will result in the creation of new nodes (e.g. new
industries) as well as changes in the intensity of use of different inputs by different
industries, which weaken some existing links while strengthening others. Crucially,
changes in technology also influence which resources are relatively scarce, and hence
the rents associated with them (Quadrio Curzio 1967; Quadrio Curzio and Pellizzari
2018). Because the direction of technological change is uncertain, so is the dynamic of
rents for different stakeholders. Therefore, stakeholders forming their stances on
policies to address vulnerability or to improve resilience will face fundamental uncer-
tainty as to how such policies will affect them dynamically (Cardinale 2015). In this
analytical context, the relevant conflict might be, for example, between owners of
different scarce resources (Quadrio Curzio and Pellizzari 2018), or between ‘owners of
life-cycle capital’ and ‘owners of inter-generational capital’ (Baranzini 1991). There-
fore, while the gist of the analysis of the paper, which was developed for the ‘static’
case of given technology, holds for dynamic analysis as well, future research will need
to devise definitions of systemic interest that are suitable for tackling dynamic
problems.
A further interesting direction might be to apply the key insights of this paper to
analyses of connectivity in other fields. In fact, while possible extensions within
economic analysis have been discussed in Section 3, one might also consider
exploring the fundamental idea of the paper—that systemic interest provides a
dimension of resilience and vulnerability that has the potential to be widely shared
across stakeholders—in the context of work that relies on network analysis in other
disciplines. For example, Barabási’s research on connectivity in network analysis
has been used across many disciplines (see Barabási 2007 for a brief review).
Accordingly, the SPE approach developed in this paper can be used to investigate
the socio-political dimension of different types of connectivity in a variety of
applications that concern socio-economic systems, in which actors’ awareness of
their interconnectedness is likely to be an important factor in the formation of their
stance towards policies addressing resilience and vulnerability. Similarly, the
connection between analysis of weak and strong links on the one hand, and of
vulnerability, resilience and systemic interest on the other hand, can generate new
insights for studies inspired, for example, by Granovetter's (1983) distinction
between strong and weak ties, or by Burt's (1992) analysis of ‘structural holes’
whereby nodes occupying specific network positions (especially that of ‘broker’)
are associated with more opportunities than other nodes, even if they have the same
number of links.
This paper’s approach to vulnerability and resilience raises the question of what
features of network connectivity are likely to be associated with systemic interest. It has
been shown that this depends not only on connectivity in itself but also on awareness of
connectivity on the part of key stakeholders. Enhancing and shaping such awareness
can therefore constitute a key contribution of research into the socio-political dimen-
sions of connectivity.
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